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A Conversation About Equality*
THE HONOURABLE CLAIRE L'HEUREUX-DUBt,
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA**
I. INTRODUCTION
Equality is a topic very near to my heart. Since I believe that you have to
pose the right questions to get good answers, I will explore some of the who's,
what's, when's, where's, and why's of equality, although not necessarily in that
order. I sincerely hope that these questions will provide a basis for us to ask
other questions, both of ourselves and of others. For posing questions, talking to
each other, and thinking about what the concept of equality means and should
mean will help all of us come to a better understanding of equality, how it ap-
plies, and what it means, both in our lives and in the law.
II. WHY IS EQUALITY SO IMPORTANT?
Why are we not prepared to accept that we can be treated with less dignity
because of the groups to which we belong or with which we identify? In my
opinion, our desire for equality stems from our desire for justice and, put simply,
inequality is injustice. It is unjust to treat people as less worthy or less deserving
because of inherent personal characteristics, circumstances in which they find
themselves, or fundamental choices they have made. It is unjust for those who
have historically held advantages and privileges in society to continue those privi-
leges at the expense of others. When there is inequality, oppression is allowed,
facilitated, and encouraged. In Canada, where we believe every member of soci-
ety is a full member, it is contrary to our conception of justice to suggest that
people can be treated as less worthy, less deserving, or less equal because of
their personal characteristics or identity.
I ask you: if you were given the opportunity to design a model society, not
knowing a priori who you would be or into what role you would be born, know-
ing only that the odds were roughly even that you would be born into a position
This paper was initially published in a longer form as C. L' Heureux-Dube,
Conversations on Equality (1999) 26 Man. L.J. 273.
** I wish to thank my law clerks for their invaluable assistance in the preparation
of this paper.
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of relative empowerment or relative disempowerment, what would your society
look like? I put it to you that almost anyone in such a position would design a
society that treated each and every individual with dignity, and offered them
equal opportunity to realize their goals and expectations. Of course, I am not
talking only about you, but about your children, and your children's children.
The call to arms of equality seekers today is really an investment in tomorrow.
III. WHERE DO WE LOOK FOR INEQUALITY?
John Stuart Mill, one of the first philosophers to recognize the interrelation-
ship between individual human dignity and the good of the community, observed
that the law assumes that existing relationships of domination and subordination
are "natural".' He argued that the law plays an insidious role when it adopts the
status quo and converts a relationship of inequality from a purely physical fact to
a legal right.2 Once inequality is clothed in the legitimising language of rights and
law, it receives the sanction of society.3 Mill asked whether there is ever domi-
nation that appears unnatural to those who wield it.
4
This observation is as true today as it was when he made it. Inequality per-
meates the social, legal, and political institutions that are central to the workings
of our society. A renewed commitment to its eradication requires that we look
deep into ourselves and into the reality experienced by those who have not his-
torically dominated "by nature".
While it is interesting to note that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms was proclaimed in force in 1982, thereby constitutionalizing certain human,
civil and political rights in Canada, implementation of section 15, which guaran-
tees "equality without discrimination" to all individuals, was delayed until 1985.'
Equality without discrimination was not a very new or revolutionary concept in
1982 and yet implementation of section 15 was delayed for three years beyond
any of the other newly constitutionalized fundamental human rights. In my view,
this delay allowed for the profound re-examination of Canada's basic laws and
institutions that the recognition of such a right required. I find it a somewhat dis-
turbing indictment of our past that, in 1982, we felt that our laws might be so
discriminatory that we would need several years of grace before permitting indi-
viduals to challenge them.
'Daniel Proulx, L'objet des droits constitutionnels 6 l'galitg 29 C. de D. 567,570
(1988).
2id.
3 Lorenne Clark, Liberalism and the Living Tree: Women, Equality and the Char-
ter 28(2) Alta. L. Rev. 384, 390 (1988), citing J.S. Mill, "The Subjugation of
Women" in Essays on Sex Equality 129-130 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1970).
4Id. at 391.
5 Const. Act 1982, pt. I, § 15 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedeoms), Sched-
ule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). [hereinafter the Charter]
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A few brief comments on some of Canada's historical equality "bench-
marks" demonstrates why our drafters' concerns may have been justified. For
instance, it was not until 1929 that the British Privy Council, acting as Canada's
final court of appeal, finally recognized that women were "persons", and thereby
able to be appointed to the Senate.6 Since that time, slowly but surely, other ob-
stacles to equality have fallen under the relentless pressure of social change.
However, many of these moves occurred much later than many people realize.
Among the most blatant examples, women could not vote in Qudbec elections un-
til 1940.' Federally, Japanese Canadians could not vote until 1948, and status
Indians gained the franchise only in 1960.8 Thus, even glaring formal inequali-
ties such as these permeated the very foundations of our democracy well into this
century.
Parliament did enact an equality guarantee in the Canadian Bill of Rights in
1960.' While this was a positive step, no great immediate strides toward substan-
tive equality came about as a result. The Bill of Rights was simply a statute like
any other. It was interpreted narrowly because it lacked the authority of a consti-
tutional document and it did not apply to provincial laws. In one infamous Bill of
Rights case, Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada, the Supreme Court held that
denying benefits on the basis of pregnancy was not sex discrimination, since the
distinction was based on the fact that the women were pregnant, rather than the
fact that they were women.' ° In another case, Attorney General v. Lavell, a law
which disqualified native women who married non-natives from receiving certain
benefits related to Indian status, but did not similarly disqualify native men, was
held not to be discriminatory, since all native women were treated equally with
respect to each other." These cases demonstrated that the Bill of Rights, as the
Supreme Court interpreted it, only guaranteed equality to the extent that people
were the same. Women, minorities, and the disabled were fully "equal" within
their individual groups, but only to the extent that they were no different from
the grouping of white, able-bodied men. For those who were disadvantaged be-
cause they were different from what society considered the 'norm', this road to
equality was a dead end.
6 Edwards v. Canada, [1930] A.C. 124.
7 Susan Jackel, Women's Suffrage in THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA:
YEAR 2000 EDITION 2535 (McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999).
8 John C. Courtney, Franchise in THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA: YEAR
2000 EDITION 907 (McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999).
9 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c.44 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985 (App. III).
[hereinafter the Bill of Rights]
10 Bliss v. Attorney General of Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183.
"1 Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349.
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IV. WHAT DOES IT MEAN IN CANADA TO SPEAK OF "EQUALITY" IN
THIS DAY AND AGE?
Unlike the American Bill of Rights, the Charter does not simply assert a
right of "equal protection"; it speaks of "equality without discrimination". 2 My
first observation about these two documents is that they grew out of two very dif-
ferent historical contexts. In order to understand the equality principle as it ap-
plies in Canada, it is necessary to consider the context in which it developed. If
American constitutional ideals were born of war and revolution, Canada's grew
through evolution. Bit by bit Canada negotiated its way towards independence,
from Confederation in 1867, to the recognition of autonomy from Great Britain
in 1931, to the patriation of the Constitution and the adoption of the Charter in
1982.13
The Charter was enacted nearly 200 years after the American Bill of
Rights. 4 Thus, it reflects the developments in human rights law of the latter half
of the 2 0' century, as well as a Canadian vision of liberty and the state, rather
than the American civil libertarian vision of the 18"' and 19th centuries. Perhaps
for this reason, the Charter places less emphasis on individual rights and more on
collective interests. This is seen in various provisions of the Charter, which tend
to surprise many Americans. For instance, rights under the Charter are subject
to an express limitation under section 1, which says that they are guaranteed,
"subject... to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society. "' s Secondly, in Canada, diversity is
not a debate-it is a constitutionally recognized value. Our constitution recog-
nizes aboriginal treaty rights and minority language education rights, while sec-
tion 27 of the Charter instructs courts to interpret Charter rights in a manner
consistent with promoting and enhancing Canada's multicultural heritage. 6
Third, property rights are noticeably absent from the Charter, primarily due to
the fear that the inclusion of property rights in a bill of rights would hamper the
power of governments to administer or enact social legislation.
Turning to the Charter's provisions on equality, section 28 states that the
"rights and freedoms referred to in the Charter are guaranteed equally to male
and female persons." 7 Finally, section 15(1), guarantees "equality. . . without
discrimination, and in particular without discrimination based on race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability". 8 Af-
12 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 15(1).
's Const. Act 1982, pt. I, § 15 (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), Sched-
ule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. II (U.K.).
"4 Id., U.S. CONST., amend. I-X.
15 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1.
" Id. at §§ 23, 25, 27.
17 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 28.
Id. at § 15(1).
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firmative action is specifically permitted under section 15(2).'9
As the Canadian courts have interpreted these provisions, equality continues
to be a comparative concept. It does not always require that we treat people in
the same way. In fact, sometimes it requires that we treat them differently. In
my view, the recognition that equality and discrimination are inextricably linked
is an important one. It is indicative of a sophisticated understanding of the values
that underlie equality. For equality isn't just about being treated the same, and it
isn't a mathematical equation waiting to be solved. Rather, it is about equal hu-
man dignity, and full membership in society. It is about promoting an equal
sense of self-worth. It is about treating people with equal concern, equal respect,
and equal consideration. These are the values that underlie equality. These are
the values that are offended when we discriminate, consciously or not.
In Canada, our present approach to equality, based on the recognition that
true equality requires substantive change and accommodation rather than simply
formalistic egalitarian treatment, was precipitated by the obviously unfair and in-
equitable results of equality claims determined under the Bill of Rights. When
we moved from the Bill of Rights to the Charter, we made three very important
changes. First, we elevated equality rights to a constitutional level. Second, we
broadened the measure of equality rights. Third, we broadened the reach of
equality rights. All three of these changes constituted essential elements of a
trend intended to promote and achieve substantive democracy in Canada, rather
than just procedural democracy. With the Charter, we have gone from requiring
that laws be applied in the same way to everyone, to the stage of requiring that
the laws, themselves, treat individuals as substantive equals. This, finally, is the
language of substantive equality.
2 0
Several Supreme Court cases illustrate particularly well the ways in which a
determination of when substantive equality rights have been violated requires an
examination of a group§s treatment in the context of Canadian society, and of
whether an individual§s fundamental dignity is violated. They show why differ-
ential treatment may in some cases lead to substantive equality, just as in other
cases, similar treatment may lead to substantive inequality.
Weatherall v. Canada is an example of a case where being treated differ-
ently did not lead to substantive inequality. 2 In that case, the male appellant had
challenged the fact that male prisoners in penitentiaries were searched and pa-
trolled by female guards, but that female prisoners were supervised only by
'9 Id. at § 15(2).
2 0 See Law v. Canada, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 548. For the first use of "substantive
equality" in a Supreme Court decision, see Symes v. Canada, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695,
786 (per L'Heureux-Dubd J. dissenting). All Supreme Court of Canada judgments
since 1985 are available through the Court's website, http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/indexe.htm
21 Weatherall v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872.
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members of their own gender.22 The unanimous judgment of our Court held that
the male prisoners had not been discriminated against relative to female prison-
ers. 23 The Court noted the historical, biological, and sociological differences be-
tween men and women, the history of women's disadvantage in society, and the
realities of male violence against women. 24 Because of these factors, cross-
gender searches do not have the same effects on men as they would have on
women.25 The Court's judgment, which upheld the different treatment of male
and female prisoners, demonstrates that equality may sometimes allow or require
differential treatment.
On the reverse side of the same coin, B. C. v. BCGSEU provides an excel-
lent example of a case where being treated the same led to substantive inequal-
ity.26 Tawney Meiorin was a firefighter who had performed her work satisfacto-
rily for over three years .27 Her union argued that she was improperly dismissed
on the basis of her failure to meet a discriminatory aerobic standard required un-
der a new series of fitness tests adopted by the British Columbia provincial Gov-
ernment.28
The Court held that under the B.C. Human Rights Code, the minimum fit-
ness standard discriminated against women and could not be justified as a bona
fide occupational requirement.29 In other words, a lower standard could still pro-
vide sufficient protection to the public, while also having a less discriminatory
impact on women. As in many other cases of human rights code violations,
courts are recognizing that standards set in relation to a traditionally dominant
group, such as male firefighters, must be reviewed from an equality perspective
in order to determine whether they are reasonably necessary to the fulfillment of
a legitimate work-related purpose.
Eldridge v. British Columbia is another case where similar treatment was
held to create substantive inequality.3 In that case, the appellants, who were
deaf, challenged the failure of the British Columbia government to provide sign
language interpreters as part of its publicly funded health care system.3" The
Court held that this constituted discrimination, since those who were not hearing





26 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Committee) v. BCGSEU,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 3.
27 id.
28 Id.
29 Id., Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C., ch. 210 (1996)(Can.).
30 Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
31 Id.
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the services necessary to receive effective medical care.32 In contrast, hearing
impaired people, who required interpreters in order to receive effective treat-
ment, were required to pay for this service, and therefore, unlike others, did not
receive the necessary services to enjoy free medical care. 33 Even though, for-
mally, this constituted identical treatment, substantively, the hearing impaired did
not receive equal services from the health care system.
34
Another example is the case of Vriend v. Alberta, which dealt with the fail-
ure of the Alberta Individual's Rights Protection Act to provide gays and lesbians
with protection against discrimination. 35 Technically, gays and lesbians and het-
erosexual people were treated the same: none could bring claims under the Al-
berta human rights legislation based on sexual orientation. 36 However, the fact
that only gays and lesbians, not heterosexuals, generally experience discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation meant that the failure to include them in the leg-
islation, even though it formally treated all citizens equally, constituted discrimi-
nation. 37
The Court's decision in Vriend shows the importance of looking beyond the
Charter for the protection of equality rights, since it applies only to government
action. 31 In looking for "WHERE" inequality occurs, we must also turn our
attention to the actions of people outside government, to ensure that in relations
with others, individuals, companies, and groups conduct themselves in accor-
dance with the principles of equality. Decisions of the Supreme Court and of
human rights commissions have reminded us that, for example, when sexual har-
assment occurs, when there is systemic discrimination within a workplace, or
when rules of the workplace have a negative impact on members of certain
groups, discrimination has occurred.
39
Provincial and federal statutory human rights codes remind us that all of our
actions must be consistent with the principles of non-discrimination, and that we
must constantly be vigilant to ensure that we respect others' equality rights. Be-
cause of their importance, our Supreme Court has recognized that human rights
codes have taken on a quasi-constitutional status, and for this reason I have advo-
cated a large and liberal evolving interpretation of the protections contained in
them. In Canada (Attorney-General) v. Mossop, for example, I argued for an ex-




35 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
36 id.
37 id.
38 See RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
39 Janzen v. Platy Enterprises, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252; Action Travail des Femmes v.
Canadian National Railway, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114; O§Malley v. Simpsons-Sears,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 550.
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against discrimination based on "family status." 40 Mr. Mossop did not receive
bereavement leave to attend the funeral of his male partner's father, although he
would have received this leave if his partner had been female.4 ' I wrote that re-
specting the promise of equality contained in the Act required an evolving and
expansive definition of family, one that recognized the reality of the diverse types
of families that exist in our society. The application of the principles of equality
required going beyond traditional definitions of family, to explore what "family"
means to different people in our society.
We must constantly be alert to the fact that the scope of the protection set
out in these equality provisions may still not be a reality for all.42 We need to
recognize that the need to identify inequality is not present only when allegations
of discrimination have been brought under section 15 of the Charter, or under
human rights codes. Rather, in examining other areas of law, we must be alert
to the ways in which the laws' assumptions may not respect the principles of
equality. This approach offers us new understandings in family law, in criminal
law, and into how the law affects the poor and the elderly. It is changing the
way we look at sexual assault, disability, freedom of expression and pornogra-
phy. The task of rooting out inequality and injustice from our society is now ad-
vancing to a higher stage, since, increasingly, we are recognizing that inequality
and discrimination stem not from positive intentions on the part of any given in-
dividual, but rather from the effects of often innocently-motivated actions. This
analysis requires that we understand equality, and make it part of our thinking,
rather than treading heavily on it with the well-worn shoes of unquestioned, and
often stereotypical, assumptions.
I will mention just two examples where the analysis in other areas of law has
required attention to the concept of equality. In Moge v. Moge, consideration of
the principles of equality, and of the historic disadvantages women faced from
marriage breakdown, informed the determination of the appropriate interpretation
of the Divorce Acts provisions on spousal support. 43 Focusing on equality en-
abled the Court to look at the perspective and experiences of women, and to en-
sure that its understanding of spousal support took into account women's needs
and realities. In R. v. Lavallge, Madame Justice Wilson, writing for the majority
of our Court, considered the circumstances of women in relationships with abu-
sive spouses and redefined the criminal law of self-defence in light of the realities
4 0 Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Mossop, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554; Canadian
Human Rights Act, S.C. ch.33 (1976-1977) reprinted in R.S.C. ch.H6
(1985)(Can.).
41 MOSSOp, [1993] 1 S.C.R. at 554.
42 For a recent decision illustrating this point, see, e.g., M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3
(holding that the opposite-sex definition of "spouse" used for spousal support de-
termination in the province of Ontario's Family Law Act violated sec. 15 of the
Charter).
43 Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813.
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of their experiences." These cases, and others like them, show that thinking
about equality is more than just analysing discrimination claims or interpreting
human rights codes. Rather, its pursuit requires an understanding of the histori-
cal disadvantages experienced by members of some groups, an awareness of
groups' differences and unique experiences, and a sensitivity to the fact that parts
of the law have been designed by and for those with power and privilege. It re-
quires that in the analysis we undertake in every area of law, we consider various
perspectives, think about the experiences and realities of disadvantaged groups,
and examine the assumptions on which our laws and jurisprudence are based.
V. WHO SHOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT INEQUALITY?
Many individuals are privileged in numerous ways. Many have never di-
rectly experienced discrimination. Nonetheless, inequality is a problem that af-
fects us all. It is short sighted to assume that it is in our interests to preserve the
systems and institutions that perpetuate our advantage and the relative disadvan-
tage of others. We now understand that people are interdependent, and the
health and dignity of our society depends on the way we treat all of its members.
When some lack the opportunities others have, or are treated without dignity, so-
ciety suffers. When individuals or governments refuse to recognize or respect
the differences of others, the cost is the fostering of intolerance in our society.
Discrimination imposes costs on us all, not just on those who are its direct vic-
tims.
Crime, poverty, unemployment, the fear of walking in the streets of one's
own neighbourhood at night, our heavily burdened social programs: few will
now dispute that all of these problems have at least some of their roots in
inequality. While working to stamp out inequality will not make these problems
go away, it is clear that ignoring inequality may very well aggravate them.
Given that inequality, discrimination and perceived injustice are highly
destabilizing forces in society, anyone who seeks a stable society gains by
weakening those forces. We all have something to learn in this regard,
particularly those who think of equality only in terms of the costs required to
achieve it. As my colleague on the Ontario Court of Appeal, Madame Justice
Rosalie Silberman Abella has observed, "We have no business figuring out the
cost of justice until we can figure out the cost of injustice".
For these reasons, we cannot be concerned only about inequality and dis-
crimination that affect us directly, but we must be vigilant to inequality affecting
others. Working toward a society free from inequality demands that we try to
see the world as experienced by others. We must not only recognize the ways in
which others are similar to us, but also acknowledge and celebrate others' differ-
ences. If we are privileged in certain ways, we must also affirm that others may
44 R. v. Lavallde, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
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be entitled to differential treatment in order to remedy past or present disadvan-
tages imposed by society.
We must remember that inequality and discrimination are as much attitudes
as actions. All of us now have a responsibility to continue to work to bring about
changes that will enable the philosophy of non-discrimination to become a reality
of substantive equality. The quest for equality does not stop when, for instance,
a woman gets a job. It demands pay equity, and a workplace that is sensitive to
the social and family demands that women often face. Equally important, it de-
mands that we recognize that not all men measure success purely by virtue of ca-
reer and financial advancement. New opportunities in the workplace will not
bring meaningful change until it becomes socially acceptable to use them. And
in striving to achieve such ends we must never be deterred by novel solutions.
VI. How Do WE ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF EQUALITY?
Equality is a term that, standing alone, means nothing. It has no universally
recognized, inherent or intrinsic content. But rather than simply trying to define
the term, I think that it is helpful to conceive of equality as a language like every
other: with rules of grammar and syntax, nuances, exceptions, and dialects. Af-
ter all, a language is more than a form of communication. It is an embodiment
of the norms, attitudes, and cultures that are expressed through that language.
Learning a language and learning a culture go hand in hand. I believe that all of
us are already familiar with the basic vocabulary of equality. On the other hand,
I hesitate to say that we are fluent in this language when, in fact, we may only
have a working knowledge of it so far. This language is new to us, because
equality analysis does not fit easily into traditional legal discourses and concepts.
It is not easy to undertake an analysis of the multiple and overlapping manifesta-
tions of inequality in our society using traditional legal tests and tools.
But like many immigrants who once came, and continue to come to North
America, we have now firmly assumed the obligation of learning a new lan-
guage, which will help carry us into tomorrow. More importantly, and after
much delay, we have finally committed ourselves to learning to speak in terms of
meaningful equality.
In our quest to learn the language of equality, we are going through many of
the same difficulties encountered by someone trying to learn a new language.
We interpret simple sentences very well. However, we lack the experience to
deal with more difficult situations. We may improvise by applying approaches
found in traditional legal discourse, but experience shows that resorting to those
rules is only appropriate when the structures underlying the two languages are
substantially the same. Our new task is to revisit our underlying assumptions
about people and social structure, to look beyond the four corners of our respec-
tive legal and social institutions, and to contemplate change when our examina-
tion reveals that the languages are inconsistent. We must try to think in terms of
this new language. As any of you who has tried to learn a second language
knows, learning to think in that language is probably the most important step to
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understanding the language, and this understanding is what is needed in turn to
speak it fluently.
We are all students of this language called equality. I should note that this
language class is particularly difficult because it is a course in which the students
must teach themselves. Fortunately, we are not without direction. Our Rosetta
Stone, our key to understanding, lies in our respective past social experiences, in
the present realities endured by those less fortunate, and in the future aspirations
of one and all. And yet the job does not end here. Implicit in our task of break-
ing down barriers, learning a new language, and questioning assumptions under-
lying some of our oldest and most venerable institutions, is our undertaking to
rebuild what we take apart.
You will recall that I began my remarks to you by posing the question,
"Why equality?". I now conclude by observing that the real question to my mind
is no longer "WHY equality?" but rather "WHEN equality?" In my view, more-
over, the appropriate answer is "Now!" To permit or perpetuate inequality is to
permit or perpetuate injustice. Our public policies, our workplaces, our institu-
tions, and our homes may serve us well, but how do they serve others? Do they
enable all people to enjoy full membership in society, and an equal sense of self-
worth? Do they accord each human being equal concern, respect and considera-
tion? These are difficult questions, but I put it to you that we owe a duty to our-
selves, to others and to the generations to come, to answer these questions, and
then to act on the answers until we've lived up to the equality standard.
The urgency of the task of promoting equality means that the guarantees of
equality in constitutional and international human rights documents here and
around the world are perhaps the most important constitutional or legal instru-
ments we have. These guarantees will, I hope, be at the centre of much of the
work of the courts in coming years, not only when appeals based on equality
provisions themselves are heard, but also as norms which inform and influence
our analysis throughout all areas of law and of life.
Yet as all students know, our understanding of concepts such as equality
continues to evolve, and it requires a constant questioning of our work and our
assumptions to ensure that our task is being accomplished well. By conversing
about equality, by explaining to each other our experiences and understandings,
and by listening to others, we can better comprehend the nuances of this evolving
concept. Questions about fairness and justice in law and society will never dis-
appear. It is my hope, however, that future generations will converse about these
questions fluently, in the language of equality, just as we speak in our native lan-
guage, or mother tongue: without effort, and in an intuitive and natural way. For
when the language of equality becomes our common language, we will truly be
able to say that we live in a just society.
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